Abstract-The multi-hop cellular network (MCN) is an evolved paradigm for mobile communications, which integrates the ad hoc characteristics into the conventional cellular systems. Similar to ad hoc networks, the performance of MCNs relies on the hypothesis that each node accepts to forward traffic for the benefit of others, which may not hold with the possible presence of selfish users. In order to stimulate the collaboration among mobile nodes in MCNs, in this paper, we propose a light-weighted secure incentive protocol (LIP). We introduce a novel reward model, in which not the source and/or the destination but the network operator credits the forwarding nodes. It is shown that our model is much more realistic for MCNs in practice and simplifies the payment scheme design as well. LIP exploits a reactive receipt-submission mechanism to identify node behavior, which significantly reduces the communication overhead. Security analysis shows that LIP can resist various attacks. The efficiency of LIP is validated through the performance evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, multi-hop cellular networks (MCNs) [1] have drawn great attention from academia and industry. MCNs allow mobile nodes forwarding traffic for other nodes or base stations (BSs), which not only preserves the characteristics of traditional SCNs but also incorporates the flexibility of ad hoc networks [2] , [3] . Compared to SCNs, MCNs have many attractive advantages. For example, MCNs extend the coverage area, improve the spatial reuse and increase the system capacity. Therefore, MCNs are considered as a promising candidate for the 4G wireless communication systems.
In MCNs, packets are forwarded by multiple intermediate nodes to reach the destination. Thus, the performance of MCNs highly relies on the collaboration among mobile nodes to relay packets for each other. However, some participating nodes may be self-interested and refuse to do so because it consumes their own limited communication and computational resources without any immediate return. In that case, the benefits of multi-hop transmissions will diminish and the network even cannot properly function. Therefore, an incentive mechanism to stimulate resource sharing and data forwarding is indispensable for the multi-hop cellular systems [4] .
The same problem in mobile ad hoc networks has been well studied by many researchers. But these schemes do not work well for MCNs, because the characteristics of MCNs are significantly different from ad hoc networks, which are summarized as follows:
This work was partially supported by US National Science Foundation under grant CNS-0916391. The work of Y. Fang was also partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant 61003300 and a gift fund from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., China. 1) Ad hoc networks are self-organized. But in MCNs, the network operator can be considered as a centralized trusted authority, which could supervise and control the operation of the whole system. 2) In ad hoc networks, packet transmissions may occur between any pair of source and destination nodes. But most traffic in MCNs needs to travel through the BSs to flow into the backbone or reach the destination.
3) The bandwidth of the control channel in cellular system is quite limited. Thus, the incentive protocols with high control overhead cannot be used in MCNs.
Several cooperation incentive proposals have been presented for MCNs. In [5] , Jakobsson et al. introduce a micro-payment scheme to encourage node collaboration in an asymmetric cellular network with a multi-hop uplink and a single-hop downlink. Due to the probabilistic payment technique exploited, forwarders may not receive their deserved credits for the relayed packets. Salem et al. extend the asymmetric network model to the case that both the up-stream and the down-stream paths are potentially multi-hop, and propose two incentive protocols [6] , [7] which could withstand a wide range of rational and malicious attacks. In order to prevent the payment evasion, their work requires the source and/or the destination to pay for all the packets, no matter whether they are received by the destination or not. But it is not fair for the honest payers to spend credits on the failed packet transmissions. In CASHnet [8] , each node relies on the ACK from the next hop to remunerate itself. CASHnet assumes the existence of a tamper-proof device in each node and a decentralized account management mechanism, but these assumptions ignore the merit of the infrastructure environment in MCNs. In [9] , Mahmoud and Shen propose a receiptsubmission based scheme DSC. They use the hash chain to aggregate receipts and reduce the overhead. However, when packet loss happens, the aggregation technique becomes ineffective and the number of the submitted receipts will increase.
In this paper, we propose a light-weighted virtual-currency based incentive protocol (LIP) to motivate node cooperations in MCNs. Compared with previous schemes, LIP has a number of unique appealing features:
• LIP is based on a novel reward model, in which the network operator pays for the packet forwarding service. Compared to the previous models where the source and/or the destination remunerate the relay nodes, our model is much more realistic for MCNs in practice and simplifies the incentive scheme design.
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• LIP exploits a reactive receipt-submission strategy to identify the forwarding behavior of the relay nodes, which not only retains the advantages of the traditional receiptsubmission approaches but also significantly lowers the communication overhead.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. Network Model
Consider a cellular network with a collection of BSs and mobile nodes. The BSs are connected with each other by a secure and fast backbone network. Each one controls a certain geographical area, called a cell. We assume that the BSs and mobile nodes have the same transmission range, which equals to the radius of a cell. Mobile nodes move freely in the network, but the mobility is not so high and there always exists a contemporaneous path from the source to the destination.
B. Transmission Model
According to the proposed implementations of multi-hop cellular architecture [1] - [3] , we assume three kinds of transmission modes in MCNs:
• Uplink mode: In this case, packets are transmitted from a mobile node to the closest BS through multiple hops.
• Downlink mode: The BS sends a batch of packets to a mobile node in the same cell with multi-hop relays.
• Ad hoc mode: The communications between two mobile nodes do not involve any infrastructure of the cellular system. It always happens when the source and the destination are close to each other.
C. Reward Model
The network operator maintains an account for each registered user, and remunerates or charges one appropriately based on its behavior. Mobile nodes will get rewards if they forward packets for the benefit of others. The monetary rewards can appear in terms of cash back, a discount on the user's subscription, or free promotion to an advanced service plan. In this paper, we use credit increment to represent all the possible forms of rewards.
One important issue in the reward model is who should provide financial support to the multi-hop relay service. Originating from the incentive proposals for ad hoc networks where no operator exists, the work in the literature for MCNs also asks the source and/or the destination to remunerate the forwarders. However, we argue that this strategy is neither justified nor efficient in practice. In MCNs, mobile nodes are encouraged to transmit packets with multi-hop relay to improve the whole system's performance. However, if the operator asks the source and/or the destination to reward the intermediate nodes, they will be reluctant to use the multihop forwarding service and prefer the traditional single-hop transmission. If it prevails, the benefits of MCNs will no longer exist and the system will degenerate to the SCNs. Additionally, since nodes are selfish, the source and/or the destination may attempt to escape from the payments after the packets have been delivered. The relay nodes are also likely to get rewards by cheating without truly forwarding the packets. The network operator has to supervise the behavior of both sides. Consequently, the complexity and overhead of the schemes are always quite high.
With the above considerations, in our scheme we designate the network operator to reward the forwarding nodes. The resulting benefit on scheme design and overhead reduction will be shown in Section V.
D. Trust and Adversary Model
We postulate that one single operator operates all the BSs and the backbone network. The operator is fully trusted by all the mobile nodes to fairly manage the accounting system. The BSs are trusted to correctly transmit packets and collect information for the operator.
Mobile nodes in the network are controlled by autonomous clients. They are not trusted to follow the protocol honestly and voluntarily. Basically, they have four characteristics:
• Selfish: Nodes are always self-interested and unwilling to sacrifice their limited resources to relay packets for others with no return.
• Greedy: Confronting the temptation of financial rewards, a mobile node may try everything possible, even cheating, to gain more credits.
• Rational: Nodes determine their behavior according to the profit resulting from it. They attempt to cheat only if the expected benefit is greater than that of acting honestly.
• Collusive: Nodes might collude together if they are able to benefit from doing so. Collusion makes some misbehavior much harder to identify.
III. DESIGN OF THE LIP PROTOCOL In this section, we will use the ad hoc transmission mode as an example to describe the design of our LIP. The uplink and downlink transmission modes can be considered as the special cases of the ad hoc transmission mode in which the BS is the source or the destination of the traffic.
A. Initialization
After registering to the cellular network, each mobile node i will receive an ID-based public/private key pair (ID i , P K i ) and a symmetric key K i from the operator. The symmetric key K i is only shared between node i and the operator.
LIP exploits ID-based cryptography to achieve the identity authentication and protect the message integrity. Each intermediate node can check the validity of the received messages, which prevents the invalid packets from propagating along the route. Compared to the standard public-key cryptography, our approach could avoid the exchange and verification of publickey certificates, which is much more efficient for MCNs.
When two mobile nodes intend to communicate, they first need to set up an end-to-end session, in which all the intermediate nodes are authenticated and accept to forward packets. The source node sends a session setup request message SREQ S to the destination, which is in the following format:
Here, ID S and ID D carry the IDs of the source and the destination nodes, respectively. SSN is the session sequence number determined by the source. The pair (ID S , SSN ) can uniquely identify any session in the system. The fields P AT H and QU AL are initially empty. Each forwarder along the route will append its ID to the P AT H field sequentially, and record the link quality into the QU AL field, such as the delivery probability. Information about the session traffic can be found in the IN F O field, such as the traffic type, the overall amount and the QoS requirement, etc. When node i receives a SREQ message, it checks the traffic information described in the IN F O field. With the concern of its available resources and the wireless link condition, node i makes a decision on joining this session or not. If it decides to participate in the forwarding, node i adds its ID into the P AT H field, computes a new HMAC with its symmetric key K i , replaces the old HMAC and transmits the updated session request message to the next hop. HMAC is the keyedhash message authentication code for data integrity check. Otherwise, it just discards the received SREQ message.
Each intermediate node processes the request message in the same way until it reaches the destination of the traffic. The destination node evaluates the quality of the path based on the information in the QU AL field to determine whether it is able to support the traffic. If no, the destination node discards the SREQ message. Otherwise, it updates the HMAC field and directly sends the pair (P AT H, HMAC KD ) to the BS through the traditional one-hop uplink. The BS repeats all the HMAC computations according to the order of the node IDs listed in the P AT H field and checks the result against the received one from the destination. If correct, the BS sends a confirmation message CF IR along the route,
where SIG is the ID-based digital signature, and || denotes message concatenation. Each node verifies the SIG field in the CF IR message. If valid, it saves ID S , SSN and the next hop in the P AT H field in the routing table. Then, the initialization phase is completed. In the rest of the paper, we assume that the established session contains M packets to be delivered. The BS creates and maintains a table for each active session indicated by the pair (ID S , SSN ) . If no such a route can be found, the transmission request will be denied.
B. Packet Sending
When the packet sending phase starts, the source could transmit packets to the destination. The format of the LIP packet contains the data payload and a few LIP fields, the format of which is as follows:
SSN, P SN, DAT A, SIG S (ID S ||SSN ||P SN||H(DAT A)) >
where P SN represents a non-decreasing session-related packet sequence number set by the source node. The triple (ID S , SSN, P SN ) can uniquely identify a packet. H is a hash function. We use the hash value instead of the payload to reduce the computational overhead of the digital signature.
When node i receives a LIP packet, it performs the following operations: 1) Check whether the packet is new or not. If the packet with sequence number (ID S , SSN, P SN ) has been received before, the node drops it since it is a duplicate. 2) Verify the SIG field. If it is incorrect, abort the processing and dump the packet. 3) Store the information in the packet to generate a receipt. 4) Output and forward the LIP packet to the next hop. Upon receiving a packet, the destination checks the validity of the SIG field and sends an acknowledgement back to the source. Each forwarder will delete the information stored about one packet when it receives the corresponding acknowledgement, and only keep the receipts for the lost packets.
C. Rewarding
Suppose different services have been classified into several categories based on the QoS requirement. In this paper, we only consider the number of packets delivered to the destination, though LIP can be easily extended to other measurements like the maximum transmission delay. Every kind of services has a required packet delivery ratio and a predetermined standard rewarding rate, which are denoted by W and α, respectively. In the initialization phase, each forwarder can obtain the information about the traffic type and the corresponding requirement from the IN F O field in the session setup request message SREQ.
When the session is closed, the destination transmits a REP message along the path to report the delivery achievement of the session:
Here, NumAck denotes the number of the packets acknowledged by the destination. When the REP message arrives at the relay node i, it checks every receipt it stored for the lost packets. If the sequence number has appeared in the REP message, node i will delete the corresponding receipt. Otherwise, it appends the sequence number to the REP message. Let P SN i = (P SN 
From the When pair (P SN i , ID i ) in the REP message, the upstream nodes and the BS know that node i takes the responsibility to submit the receipts for the packets with sequence numbers in P SN i . In this way, LIP reduces the overhead on identifying intermediate nodes' behavior for each lost packet by only making the last receiver submit the receipt.
When the REP message is delivered to the source, it adds another field NumSnd, which contains the number of packets transmitted before the session is closed. Then, it forwards the REP directly to the BS. The BS records the information about NumSnd, NumAck, which packets are lost and which nodes will report the receipts for them in the table it maintains for this session. It also calculates the achieved packet delivery ratio, which is denoted by μ, as the ratio of NumAck to NumSnd, i.e., μ = N umAck/N umSnd. Based on them, the performance of the multi-hop packet forwarding service has three classes with different rewarding rates:
• Completed: All packets in the session are transmitted, and the delivery requirement is satisfied. Packet loss is mainly due to the random error of the wireless links. Since the packet forwarding job is well finished, each relay node will gain αM credits for the whole session.
• Interrupted: The achieved packet delivery ratio μ exceeds the requirement W , but the source node does not send out all the packets when the session is closed, i.e., NumSnd < M . This can be caused by the sudden exit of some relay nodes. In this case, the rewarding rate will decrease to β because the session is not finished. Each forwarder will get βN umSnd credits in total.
• Failed: When the session is closed, only a few packets are received by the destination and the required delivery ratio is not achieved. The session is considered as failed. Because in the initialization phase the destination node selects the path which can support the session, the failure cannot be caused by the link random error and with high probability attacks happen during the transmissions. The rewarding rate is γ credits per packet, where γ < β < α. The operator will first reward the relay nodes for the packets acknowledged by the destination, and active the receipt-submission mechanism. Each forwarder is informed by the BS to submit the receipts according to what they reported in the REP message. To reduce the communication overhead caused by the receipt transmissions, each forwarder, say node i, sends the receipts in an aggregated form, the format of which is shown below:
) lists all the hash values of the lost packets which the receipt RCT i is submitted for. HMAC Ki is the aggregated result of a series of HMAC, i.e.,
where the SIG i j denotes the SIG field in P KT i j . The BS verifies the receipt RCT i . If the verification is correct, the operator remunerates all the upstream forwarders of node i along the route for their forwarding action at rewarding rate γ. The operator also reimburses node i for the transmission of the receipt RCT i . From the above description we could see that, in our scheme, when the impact of misbehavior is small and most of the packets are successfully received by the destination, none of the receipts are transmitted. Only when the attacks become severe and the throughput decreases, the receiptsubmission mechanism is active. In this way, LIP guarantees the performance of MCNs under the appearance of selfish nodes and significantly reduces the communication overhead.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS In our scheme the credit payer is the network operator, so the source and/or the destination have no incentive to launch attacks for escaping from the payments, such as denial of service, not sending acknowledgements, etc. Next we will analyze how LIP prevents the attacks carried out by the dishonest forwarders. Note that we will focus on rational attacks. Malicious attacks are not considered in this paper.
A. Double Rewarding
A greedy node may try to submit the same receipt multiple times to gain undeserved credits. Our LIP only requires the last receiver to declare receipts for the lost packets to determine which nodes should be remunerated. The decision does not rely on the number of the receipts reported by each node.
B. Free Riding
Two dishonest intermediate nodes can piggyback their own messages on the relayed packets and exploit the concurrent session for their private communications. To do so, they can avoid the cost for the session establishment.
Since the BS is trusted, it will not disclose any private key or generate a SIG field on behalf of a certain node. Therefore, the misbehavior nodes cannot compute the correct SIG on the modified packet. The invalid packet will be discarded when it is relayed by the honest nodes residing between the attackers.
C. Forwarding Partial Packet
Several intermediate nodes on the path could collude together and transmit only part of a packet which is enough to generate receipts. In this way, they attempt to earn credits with minimum resource consumption.
In the downlink transmission mode, the BS has the copy of every transmitted packet. If some forwarders transmit an incomplete packet to their colluders, the packet will not be acknowledged by the destination. Moreover, the colluding nodes are not able to produce the valid receipt without the entire packet. Therefore, the attackers cannot get the credits from the operator. But for the uplink and ad hoc transmission scenarios, it is hard to protect the system against the forwarding partial packet attack, since the BS has no reliable knowledge on the lost packets to verify the reported receipts. In our LIP, to launch the attack, the colluders have to forward the H(DAT A) and the SIG field of each packet for receipt generation. We can reduce the rewarding rate γ to make it equal to or less than the cost of the transmission. In that case, selfish nodes will have no incentive to carry out the attack.
V. EVALUATION

A. Communication
In this subsection, we analyze the communication overhead of our scheme. Since reducing cost on the receipt transmissions is essential to the implementation of a receipt-submission based scheme, we focus on the comparison of the number and size of the submitted receipts in LIP with those in other existing approaches. In our evaluation, the length of node ID and the sequence number are 16 bytes and 4 bytes, respectively [6] . Table I illustrates the receipt sizes of different protocols. Here, 1024-bit RSA is selected as the digital signature scheme, and the message digest function is MD5 [10] . Express, DSC and LIP generate one aggregated receipt for a series of packets. In our comparison, we assume their aggregated receipts are for the same 10 packets. In Sprite, the receipt includes a digital signature of the packet, which increases its length. To reduce the cost of the signature, the other three protocols use the hash function instead. Express has the largest receipt size because it packs the receipts of several packets into one message without aggregation. The receipt of LIP is larger than that of DSC due to the hash value of each packet in H field. Fig. 1 shows the simulation results on the number of submitted receipts under different packet delivery ratio. Assume one established session contains 100 packets to be transmitted. According to the experiment results in [9] , we suppose the number of intermediate nodes is 4. Node mobility is not considered since it has the same effect on all the protocols. Sprite asks each relay node to submit one receipt for every packet it transmitted. As the packet delivery ratio increases, more packets are successfully forwarded by the intermediate nodes to the destination. Therefore, the number of receipts increases as well. In both DSC and Express, one receipt is generated for a batch of continually received packets, so they have almost the same number of receipts to report. But when the packet delivery ratio is low, more receipts are submitted because discrete packet receiving frequently happens. Different from other schemes, in LIP each forwarder only sends one aggregated receipt no matter how many packets in the session are not delivered to the destination. Thus, the number of the receipts is bounded by the number of the relay nodes, which is independent of the packet delivery ratio.
In Fig. 2 , we presents the overall overhead of receipt submission in different incentive protocols. Because the receipt size is moderate and the receipt number is extremely small, LIP has the minimum overhead among all the schemes.
B. Computation
In LIP, the major online processing overhead is the HMAC computation, the SIG generation and verification. According to the implementation results with the Crypto++5.6 [11] , a mobile node equipped with a 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron 8354 processor under Linux operating system can perform a HMAC computation with SHA-1 algorithm [12] at 187 Mbytes/s. For ECNR over GF(2 n ) 233, the speed of the signature and verification is 5.52 Milliseconds/operation and 6.73 Milliseconds/operation, respectively. The results could be scaled correspondingly to estimate the computational overhead for real mobile nodes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a light-weighted virtual-currency based incentive protocol LIP to motivate node cooperation for packet forwarding in MCNs. A new reward model is proposed, which is much more practical and reduces the complexity of the scheme design. LIP has high flexibility and can be well adapted to all communication scenarios in MCNs. The performance evaluation shows that LIP is able to resist a wide range of rational attacks with low communication and computational overhead.
